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Introduction
Recent developments in cooperative game theory analyse the formation of coalitions in the context of exter-
nalities based on the partition or valuation function (see for instance Bloch (2003) and Yi (1997)). Typical
examples include Cournot-oligopolies, public good agreements, research coalitions, association of firms
and customs unions. The partition (valuation) function assigns to each coalition structure, i.e., a partition
of players, a vector of coalitional (individual) payoffs, called worth (valuations). For the partition but also
for the valuation function it is assumed that coalitions chose their (economic) strategies by maximizing the
sum of coalition members payoffs, taking the strategies of outsiders as given. Thus, coalitions play a Nash
equilibrium that sometimes is referred to as coalitional equilibrium. Hence, a necessary condition for the
analysis of stable coalitions is that a coalitional equilibrium exists for each coalition structure. Moreover,
a convenient and often implicitly assumed condition is that the coalitional equilibrium for each coalition
structure is unique which implies unique worth and valuations.
Though existence proofs can be found for example in Ray and Vohra (1997), they all are technical.
Therefore, we provide with Theorem 1 an existence result that can be immediately applied to most eco-
nomic models with a simple proof. To the best of our knowledge, uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium
has not been addressed so far. With Theorem 2 we show how a not so well-known uniqueness result of
Corchón (1996) can be generalized for this purpose. We apply our results to public good agreements and
homogeneous Cournot-oligopolies. It turns out that in the latter example uniqueness requires apart from
Theorem 2 some additional arguments.
2 Coalitional Equilibria
Let Γ be a game in strategic form between N(≥ 1) players, with Xi the strategy space of player i and f i
his payoff function. Thus, Xi is a non-empty set and f i is a real-valued function with domainX := X1 ×
· · ·×XN . A coalition is a subset ofN := {1, . . . , N}. A coalition structure C is a set consisting of disjoint
non-empty coalitions whose union is N . If S is a coalition, say, S = {s1, . . . , sl} with s1 < · · · < sl, we
defineXS := Xs1 × · · · ×Xsl . Note thatXN = X. If S is a coalition, we write Ŝ := N\S. Sometimes,
we identify X with XS ×XŜ and then write x = (xS ;xŜ) ∈ X.
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For S 6= ∅, define the function FS : X→ R by FS :=
∑
j∈S f
j
. When x = (a;b) ∈ XS ×XŜ (and
we like to see b as a parameter), we also write FS
b
(a) instead of FS(a;b); so FS
b
: XS → R. We define
the correspondence RS : XŜ ( XS by RS(b) := argmax FS
b
.
Definition 1 Given a coalition structure C, n ∈ X is called a C-equilibrium if nS ∈ RS(nŜ) (S ∈ C). 
3 Existence and Uniqueness
Theorem 1 Fix a coalition structure C. If each strategy setXi is compact and convex, each payoff function
f i is continuous and the functions FS
b
are quasi-concave, then there exists a C-equilibrium. 
Proof.— Let C1, . . . , Ck be the elements of C. Define the mapping φC : XC
1
× · · · × XC
k
→ X by
φC(x
C1 , . . . ,xC
k
) := x and the correspondence RC : X ( X by RC(x) := φC(RC
1
(xĈ
1
) × · · · ×
RC
k
(xĈ
k
)). Then, we have for n ∈ X: n is a C-equilibrium ⇔ n is a fixed point of the correspondence
RC . Thus, the proof is done if we show thatRC has a fixed point. X is non-empty and as a product of com-
pact spaces compact. The quasi-concavity of FS
b
implies that the set RS(b) is convex and its continuity
implies that RS(b) is non-empty and closed. The continuity also implies (using Berges’ maximum theo-
rem) that the correspondences RCi are upper semi-continuous. This implies that also the correspondence
RC is at most singleton-valued, convex-valued, closed-valued and upper semi-continuous, as desired for
applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. 2
The next theorem provides sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a C-equilibrium. An obvious
modification of these conditions implies uniqueness of coalitional equilibria for each coalition structure.
Theorem 2 Consider a game in strategic form Γ where each strategy set Xi is an interval of R containing
more than one point. Fix a coalition structure C. Suppose for each S ∈ C and i ∈ S that the partial
derivative of the function FS with respect to i exists as an element of R := R∪{−∞,+∞}. Furthermore,
suppose there exists an increasing function1 ϕ : X→ R and with Y := ϕ(X), for each S ∈ C and i ∈ S a
function T iS : Xi × Y → R that is strictly decreasing in its first and decreasing in its second variable such
that for each x ∈ X
∂FS
∂xi
(x) = T iS(x
i, ϕ(x))
holds. Then,
1. the function ϕ is constant on the set of all C-equilibria and
2. if ϕ is strictly increasing, then there exists at most one C-equilibrium. 
Proof.— Let x∗ and x• be C-equilibria. We may suppose that y∗ := ϕ(x∗) ≥ ϕ(x•) =: y•.
First, we prove that for all S ∈ C and i ∈ S the inequality xi∗ ≤ xi• holds. If xi∗ = infXi or
xi• = supX
i
, then this result holds. Otherwise, xi∗ is not a left boundary point of Xi and xi• is not
a right boundary point of Xi. Because x∗ is a C-equilibrium, xS∗ is a maximizer of the function FSxŜ
∗
.
This implies that xi∗ is a maximizer of the function xi 7→ FS(xi;xıˆ∗) and therefore it follows that 0 ≤
∂FS
∂xi
(x∗) = T
i
S(x
i
∗, y∗). By the same token, 0 ≥ ∂F
S
∂xi
(x•) = T
i
S(x
i
•, y•). Therefore, T iS(xi∗, y∗) ≥
T iS(x
i
•, y•). Because y• ≤ y∗, we have T iS(xi∗, y•) ≥ T iS(xi∗, y∗). Thus, T iS(xi∗, y•) ≥ T iS(xi•, y•). Because
T iS is strictly decreasing in xi we have xi∗ ≤ xi•. Now we even may conclude that x∗ ≤ x•.
We now have ϕ(x∗) ≤ ϕ(x•). Thus, ϕ(x∗) = ϕ(x•) and the proof of 1 is complete. If ϕ is strictly
increasing, then x∗ ≤ x• together with ϕ(x∗) = ϕ(x•) implies that x∗ = x•, which proves 2. 
1This means that for a = (a1, . . . , an), b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ X we have a ≥ b (i.e., ai ≥ bi for all i) ⇒ ϕ(a) ≥ ϕ(b).
Furthermore, ϕ is strictly increasing means that for a,b ∈ X we have a > b (i.e., ai ≥ bi for all i with at least one inequality strict)
⇒ ϕ(a) > ϕ(b).
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4 Applications
In both applications which are general versions of games considered for instance in Bloch (2003) and Yi
(1997), we analyse a game in strategic form with Xi := R+ or with Xi := [0,mi] (with mi > 0).
Public Good Game:
f i(x1, . . . , xN ) := βi(
N∑
l=1
xl)− γi(xi).
The functions βi :
∑N
l=1X
l → R and γi : Xi → R are continuous and strictly increasing. βi will be
called benefit function and γi cost function.
Theorem 3 Consider a public good game with concave benefit functions and with strictly convex cost
functions. Fix a coalition structure C.
1. If each strategy space is compact, then the game has a C-equilibrium.
2. If each benefit and cost function is differentiable, then the game has at most one C-equilibrium. 
Proof.— 1. We apply Theorem 1. The only thing that may not be clear is the quasi-concavity of FS
b
. Well,
with z :=
∑
l∈Ŝ
bl, we have
FS
b
(a) =
∑
j∈S
βj(z +
∑
l∈S
al) +
∑
j∈S
−γj(aj).
The first sum is a sum of concave functions and therefore concave. The second sum is a strictly concave
function. Thus, FS
b
is even strictly concave.
2. First observe that ∂F
S
∂xi
(a;b) =
∑
j∈S β
j ′(
∑
l∈S a
l +
∑
l∈Ŝ
bl) − γi
′
(ai). Next, we apply Theo-
rem 2(2) with ϕ(x) := ∑Nl=1 xl and T iS(xi, y) := ∑j∈S βj ′(y)− γi′(xi). 2
Homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly Game:
f i(x1, . . . , xN ) := p(x1 + · · ·+ xN )xi − ci(xi).
The function p :
∑N
l=1X
l → R+ is decreasing and continuous, and ci : Xi → R+ is continuous and
strictly increasing. p is called inverse demand function and ci cost function.
Theorem 4 Consider a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game with convex cost functions and a concave
inverse demand function. Fix a coalition structure C.
1. If each strategy space is compact, then the game has a C-equilibrium.
2. If p is differentiable with p′ < 0, each cost function is differentiable and each S ∈ C contains a
player with a strictly convex cost function, then the game has at most one interior C-equilibrium. 
Proof.— 1. We apply Theorem 1. The only thing that may be not clear is the condition on FS
b
. With
z :=
∑
l∈Ŝ
bl, we have
FS
b
(a) =
∑
j∈S
p(
∑
l∈S
al + z)aj −
∑
j∈S
cj(aj).
The second sum is a convex function of a while it is a sum of convex functions of each of the separate
variables. Therefore, the proof is complete if we can show that the first sum is concave. For this in turn it
is sufficient to prove that for each j ∈ S the function aj 7→ p(
∑
l∈S a
l + z)aj is concave. Note that this
function is a function on Xi ⊆ R+ and is a product of a decreasing concave function of aj multiplied by
aj ; such a product is known to be also concave.
2. Given S ∈ C, define the function g : XS → R by g(xS) :=
∑
i∈S c
i(xi) and given K ∈ R, denote
BK := {aS ∈ R
#S |
∑
l∈S a
l = K}. Let K be the set of K ∈ R for which XS ∩ BK 6= ∅. For each
3
K ∈ K the restricted function g  BK has a unique minimizer m(K). (Indeed, we have a continuous
strictly convex function on a non-empty compact convex subset of R#S .) Denote by K′ the set of elements
K ∈ K for which m(K) is in the interior of XS . Now define MS : K′ → R by
MS(K) :=
1
#S
∑
i∈S
ci
′
(mi(K)).
MS is strictly increasing. In order to prove this, fix K1,K2 ∈ K′ with K1 < K2. It is sufficient to prove
that ci′(mi(K1)) < ci
′
(mi(K2)) (i ∈ S). Because
∑
l∈Sm
l(K1) = K1 < K2 =
∑
l∈Sm
l(K2), there
exists j ∈ S such that mj(K1) < mj(K2). Noting that m(K) is interior, we find for p = 1, 2 (apply-
ing the method of Lagrange) ci′(mi(Kp)) = cj ′(mj(Kp)) (i ∈ S). Because cj ′ is strictly increasing,
ci
′
(mk(K1)) < c
i′(mk(K2)) for all i.
Using this preparation, we now prove the statement. Suppose x∗ and x• are interior C-equilibria. We
may suppose that y∗ :=
∑N
l=1 x
l
∗ ≥
∑N
l=1 x
l
• =: y•. Note that for ? = ∗, •, we have: xS? is the
unique maximizer of the (strictly quasi-concave) function FS
xŜ
?
: XS → R, i.e. of the function aS 7→
p(
∑
l∈S a
l +
∑
l∈Ŝ
xl?)
∑
l∈S a
l −
∑
l∈S c
l(al). With wS? :=
∑
l∈S x
l
?, x
S
? is a minimizer of the function
X
S ∩BwS
?
→ R defined by a 7→
∑
l∈S c
l(al). Hence, by the definition of MS , we have
1
#S
∑
i∈S
ci
′
(xS? ) =M
S(wS? ).
Because xS? is for each S ∈ C a maximizer of the function FSxŜ
?
, it follows that for each i ∈ S, xi? is a
maximizer of the function xi 7→ FS(xi;xıˆ?). Because xi? is interior, it follows that
0 =
∂FS
∂xi
(x?) = p
′(y?)w
S
∗ + p(y?)− c
i′(xi?). ,
Therefore for each S ∈ C, we have p′(y?)wS? + p(y?) = 1#S
∑
i∈S c
i′(xi?) = M
S(wS? ). We now prove
that wS∗ ≤ wS• (S ∈ C). Fix S ∈ C. Because y• ≤ y∗ and p and p′ are decreasing, it follows that
p′(y•)w
S
∗ + p(y•)−M
S(wS∗ ) ≥ p
′(y∗)w
S
∗ + p(y∗)−M
S(wS∗ ) = p
′(y•)w
S
• + p(y•)−M
S(wS• ).
Because the function R+ → R defined by
w 7→ p′(y•)w + p(y•)−M
S(w)
is strictly decreasing, wS∗ ≤ wS• must hold. Because we have this inequality for each S ∈ C, it follows that
y∗ ≤ y•. Therefore, y∗ = y•, and hence
∑
S∈C w
S
∗ =
∑
S∈C w
S
• . This in turn implies that even wS∗ = wS•
must hold for each S ∈ C. Now xi∗ = xi• for all i by ,. 2
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